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Putin-Kocharian: Similarities and Differences, According to Giragosian

Traditionally, developments in Russia tend to both impact and influence events in Armenia. Across a wide range of areas, from military and security issues to economic and political trends, Russia exerts significant influence over Armenia. So writes Regional Studies Center (RSC) NGO Director, political analyst Richard Giragosian, who, in a blog entry on CommonSpace.eu, notes parallels between recent political developments in Russia — that is, the nomination of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections — and the reality in Armenia.

“The return of Putin may exert significant influence over the course of Armenian politics, as it may encourage a similar return to power by former Armenian president Robert Kocharian. Unlike the carefully constructed Russian model of political succession, as in the cases of both the Yeltsin-Putin handover and the Putin-Medvedev arrangement, former President Kocharian has been increasingly distressed over recent shifts in Armenian politics, for several reasons.

“First, Kocharian’s personal selection of successor, current President Serzh Sargsyan, did not go as planned. Although Sargsyan was seen as a loyal defense minister, and later as compliant prime minister through the Kocharian Administration, from the very start of the Sargsyan presidency, a potent rivalry and potential rift quickly emerged between the two men. Having assumed the presidency during a violent post-election crisis in February 2008 marked by serious opposition protests, Sargsyan inherited both a damaged presidency and a legacy of distrust,” writes Giragosian.

Though Sargsyan’s presidency differ greatly from the “subservience” of Russia’s Medvedev model, continues the analyst, in terms of the Russian-Armenian political context, there is “a stronger, but more troubling, parallel between Kocharian and Putin”:

“The relationship between Kocharian and Putin, which was viewed as friendly and close during their time as presidents, is also linked to their shared worldview, being born less than two years apart, and personal experience, each having adapted to the post-Soviet system after making their mark within the waning Soviet system. In fact, Kocharian did much to lock Armenia ever more firmly within the Russian orbit and after leaving office, was duly rewarded with a lucrative position working for a Russian corporation. After his personal sense of disappointment with Sargsyan as his anointed successor, Kocharian may once again imitate his role model by seeking a similar return to politics, likely hoping and expecting that a return of his idol to the Russian presidency would ease his own comeback. Thus, for both Armenia and Russia, and for Kocharian and Putin, this is politics of personality, not policy.

“But unlike Putin, Kocharian faces new challenges, ranging from the plummeting of his personal popularity to the difficulty in returning to the political arena. The difficulty for Kocharian is that unlike Putin, who remains fairly popular and even more popularly respected, a large number of Armenians blame Kocharian for the events of March 2008, one of the few cases of violence and bloodshed between Armenians. Many more now see his policies as discredited and also blame him for allowing the ‘oligarchs’ to accumulate power and wealth unchecked and unchallenged.

“Moreover, another key difference is one of position. As present Russian premier, Putin continues to overshadow his successor, while the former Armenian president is widely seen as just that — former. In this context, Kocharian’s political standing and power has eroded over time, and his past power, as the president of Nagorno-Karabakh from 1994-1997 and as Armenian premier from 1997-1998, is just that — past.”

Commonspace.eu is an initiative to promote dialogue on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and wider issues connected with the future of the Caucasus Region. It is implemented in the framework of the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), with the support of the European Union.