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“Слава Україні” sounds very much like “Слава Украине”

Andriy Kulykov, a journalist based in Kyiv, gave an interview to his colleagues from Yerevan-based news outlet Epress, who were on a work trip to Ukraine in November 2025.

video in Russian with Armenian subtitles 

—We, as journalists — together with our authorities — have fallen short in being honest with our audience. A lot of things have been only half-said. In the beginning, a policy of feeding illusions was implemented — about an imminent victory or, even better, Russia’s imminent defeat. Similar talks were circulating back in 2014, when Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk were being taken. The popular theory was that this was the start of the inevitable and fast fall of the Russian Empire. I still don’t know how those people were measuring “fast.”

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A considerable part of the people never liked President Zelensky in the first place. I think the Russians succeeded in amplifying these sentiments. Some people are inclined to connect our setbacks in the war — as well as the war itself — personally to Zelensky’s government.

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There was the issue of evacuating civilians from the frontline. At times, when it was declared that, say, 50 people remain in this or that village, this or that town and they refuse to leave, even though they are aware that the Russians will soon march in, they were immediately stigmatized — as those expecting the Russians, as the enemy, a disguised enemy. Things are more complicated than that. People might have a myriad of reasons not to leave their towns. The same happened in 2014, when most of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk were occupied. Many didn’t leave because their family graves were there. For others, it was their garden — their main source of livelihood. Others couldn’t move because they couldn’t leave their ill father or mother. We’ve already been through this; we seemed to have understood it. But now it’s a new wave, and the scale is much bigger, and, most importantly, there is a tangible, clear opponent. If in 2014 or in 2015–2016 Russia tried to conceal its participation, now it doesn’t even deny it. It has become easier to say: “Look, they are waiting for the Russians.”

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In 2022, there were many volunteer fighters; frontline units were largely composed of volunteers. Then the draft began, which was also organized through coercive means. Those who really didn’t want to go were taken anyway. If the families of volunteers were more or less at peace with their husband — or, in some cases, wife — going to war, the relatives of those drafted coercively are not at peace with this. I think you understand this very well.

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There has been a transition from the great enthusiasm present in the initial stage to more measured discussions about possible peace. Peace is now discussed as the cessation of military actions along the existing borders, along the current frontline, even though officially — and, as polling confirms, most commonly — the most desired outcome is the restoration of the 1991 borders. Some speak about the 2022 line of contact, but the Russians are not planning to retreat, and we still do not have the strength to push them back. Therefore, in the emerging situation, the conversation is mostly about stopping the war along the current frontline.

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Recently, in a rather symptomatic way, Finland and the “Finnish scenario” are mentioned more and more often. Previously, that precedent was discussed mainly as an example of heroism: a small country that, despite enormous losses, resisted the aggression of a large one. Now the conversations are different. A few months ago, Ukrainska Pravda published an article stating that Finland managed to preserve its independence at the cost of giving up territories already captured by Russia. This is indeed symptomatic. The Finns, at that time, evacuated all their population from the territories seized by the Soviet Union — around 480,000 people, if I recall correctly. Now Karabakh is also being discussed in the context of mass evacuation. I was present at a situation like this: one expert, with whom we were talking about something entirely different — Ukraine and the possible end of the war — said, “There is the Azerbaijan’s case: it won the war in which it was initially losing — that is a valuable precedent.” The other expert strongly objected: “But that is also a precedent of mass deportation — one that hasn’t been seen since forever, especially in our post-Soviet region.”

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Little by little, people are beginning to express concerns about the role of the military in our future political life. “The war will end, the military will return from the frontline — what will they do?” They will compete for power. No one knows, and no one can possibly know when the war will end, but we need to start thinking about it already. Perhaps in Kyiv you have seen the propaganda posters — of Azov, the 3rd Assault Brigade, and our other units. At first, I thought these were intended to attract new volunteers, support mobilization, and boost combat morale. However, this propaganda is spreading. Whereas before the posters appeared only on billboards, now they are also on the rooftops of large buildings. The huge Azov posters… they are already being interpreted differently. Perhaps they are preparing for active political participation.

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— Is there any proof that Zelenskyy was directly involved in major corruption?

— Proof that the money went directly to Zelenskyy — there isn’t any, at least for now.

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— The language issue is widely discussed in the media and on social networks — sometimes very heatedly. If I understand correctly, in everyday life, in the trenches, people find common language better. Does this really happen, or is it just an impression?

— I know this very clearly, and I think it’s important not to forget that Russian language and Russian culture were used by imperial authorities to suppress Ukrainian culture and other cultures. I’m aware of the situation in Belarus, too and so on, and so forth. But a person has the right to speak in the language in which they were raised. There are habits formed over decades. Many of my fellow citizens did not feel the necessity to speak Ukrainian until 2014, and some not until 2022 — I can be sorry about this, but I cannot blame them. Many Ukrainian soldiers speak Russian in the trenches. Some, by the way, feel embarrassed about this, they would like to speak Ukrainian. But a person in his mid-40s or 50s, who has gone to war to defend Ukraine, risking their life and future, and “Слава Україні” sounds very much like “Слава Украине”.

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— You were speaking about the achievements of Russian propaganda. Could you name a couple of key points? What did they succeed at ?

—Among the people I’ve known for a long time — if not friends, at least close or amicable acquaintances — there is this perception: “If we hadn’t resisted, maybe this would have already ended, civilians wouldn’t have been killed, there wouldn’t have been power outages,” “people, even those living far from the frontline, wouldn’t have had to suffer or face these hardships… we shouldn’t have fought Russia,” “in that case, everything, or at least many things, would have been better.” This is the success of propaganda. I have heard a similar view from some of my foreign colleagues: <…> “If they hadn’t resisted, none of this would have happened.”