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Sargsyan, Hakobyan Did Not Deny Armenia’s Arms Transfer to Iran: WikiLeaks

A leaked US embassy cable dated Jan. 14, 2009, published by The Guardian on Dec. 6, 2010, reveals that Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan acknowledged purchasing weapons from Bulgaria and “either he nor the NSS Chairman challenged our information that these weapons were then transferred to Iran/Iraq.”

Recall that in a cable published by the Guardian earlier, senior US officials, in a Dec. 24, 2008 letter, had threatened wide-ranging US retaliation, including sanctions, if the Armenian government did not halt arms transfers to Iran, which they say resulted in Iranian proxies killing US soldiers in Iraq.

The Jan. 14, 2009 cable, classified by US Ambassador in Armenia Marie L. Yovanovitch, summarized two meetings on Armenia’s role in the arms transfer to Iran: one between US Ambassador Mahley and RA President Serzh Sargsyan, and the other between Mahley and NSS (National Security Service) Chair Gorik Hakobyan, which Mahley said went “better than expected.”

“Both men [Hakobyan and Sargsyan] indicated that there would be an investigation into how the weapons went from Armenia to Iran/Iraq. Hakobian seemed to indicate that the blame most probably lay with the Bulgarians and perhaps unauthorized Armenians acting on their own. Probably in an attempt to minimize US demands, they also noted that there have been significant reforms and personnel changes since the incident [i.e. “two deputy defense ministers had been fired since the transfer happened”],” reads the cable summary, in part.

In the meeting with Hakobyan, according to the cable, Mahley laid out the US evidence that Armenia facilitated “Iran’s acquisition of RPG-22s and PKM machine guns, which have been recovered in arms caches of Iranian- sponsored insurgent groups in Iraq.” 

The US investigation revealed that the weapons originated in Bulgaria, which were then shipped to Armenia:

“In addition, we shared with Hakobian that in early January 2003, the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Armenian Ministry of Defense concluded a deal to purchase the RPG-22s and the PKM machine guns; the Armenian XXXXXXXXXXXX served as an intermediary in the transaction. INR analyst Stewart Eales then reviewed the documentary evidence that we had to support this conclusion. 

“First, as part of this deal an end-user certificate from Armenia was signed by then- Defense Minister [Serzh] Sargsian. Hakobian acknowledged that the signature was that of Sargsian. In response to the presentation of the invoice for the transfer, Hakobian asked who from Armenia signed the document. Mahley said that we did not have that information. Eales then explained that the financial document showed that the money for the deal came from an Iranian front company through an Armenian bank to Bulgaria.”

Hakobyan, according to Mahley’s assessment, was particularly concerned with how the goods were transferred to Armenia and also stated that it was possible the weapons were delivered to Armenia, “but some of them were subsequently diverted in a scheme to make money.” Further, the NSS Chair was interested in knowing whether Bulgaria sold the arms to Armenia knowing they were going to Iran. Mahley and INR analyst Stewart Eales, also present during the meeting, however, explained that the Bulgarians were not aware of the involvement of an Iranian in the transaction.”

The meeting concluded with Hakobyan being “committed to use all available resources of the GOAM to fully investigate this transfer and share an official report with the USG [United States Government].”

In the meeting with Sargsyan, Mahley notes:

“Somewhat surprisingly, the [Armenian] President has reversed the mantra he has repeated for the last four months that the weapons transfer ‘did not happen and could not have happened.’ It’s not clear what has prompted this abrupt climb down, but it is probably some combination of solid evidence, a compelling presentation, an understanding of the consequences non- cooperation could bring, a desire to get off on the right foot with the new administration — and a Soviet-style calculation that they can sign the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding], but probably won’t really have to implement it.” 

In that meeting, Sargsyan confirmed the acquisition of arms from Bulgaria: “He stated that the information about the contract with Bulgaria is correct and the GOAM needs to explore further how the weapons got to Iran or Iraq. ‘We know that we got the weapons. We will figure out how they were transferred and we will let you know,’ the President assured Mahley.”

The cable summary by the US Ambassador concludes on an upbeat note: “While there will no doubt be hard questions during the meeting on the MOU and actual implementation will pose even greater challenges, we are — unexpectedly — in the best place we could be going into discussions on the MOU.”